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Chapter 6  
The Taiwanese ‘Philips’ CD-R Cases: 
Abuses of a Monopolistic Position, Cartel 
and Compulsory Patent Licensing  
Kung-Chung Liu  
1.  INTRODUCTION  
A Compact Disc (CD) is an optical disc used to store digital data, originally 
developed for storing digital audio. The CD, available on the market since October 
1982, was jointly developed by Philips (Dutch) and Sony (Japanese). The 
technology was later adapted and expanded following the standards set by Philips 
and Sony in a series of Red Book, Yellow Book and Orange Book to include data 
storage CD-ROM (Read Only Memory), write-once audio and data storage CD-R 
(Recordable), rewritable media CD-RW, Video Compact Discs (VCD), Super 
Video Compact Discs (SVCD), PhotoCD, PictureCD, CD-i, and Enhanced CD. 
The dye materials developed by Taiyo Yuden (Japanese) made it possible for 
CD-R discs to be compatible with Audio CD and CD-ROM discs.
1
 
Philips, Sony 
and Taiyo Yuden have pooled their patents together and started to jointly license 
the pooled patents through a Joint Licensing Agreement (JLA), in 1992 with one 
royalty formula: 3% of the net sales price and not lower than ¥ 10.  
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Philips was designated as the sole contact for licensing the pooled patents. 
Taiwanese manufacturers secured licenses from Philips sometime in 1996 and 
managed to occupy 80% of CD-R’s world market in 2003.  
The market price of a CD-R disc at the time the said licensing agreements 
were entered into was approximately ¥ 300, and any difference between 3% of the 
net sales price and ¥ 10 would have been negligible. As the market price of CD-Rs 
in the meanwhile dropped drastically,
 2
 the minimum royalty of ¥ 10 presented 
unbearable burdens. Philips et al. refused to accommodate repeated requests from 
Taiwanese licensees to lower the minimum royalty of ¥ 10 to reflect the falling 
prices of CD-Rs. A dilemma similar to that of ‘The Merchant of Venice’ emerged; 
whether it would be better to cut a pound of flesh and die to honour the contract, or 
to find a way to render the contract unenforceable, or to annul it. Taiwanese CD-R 
manufacturers disagreed amongst themselves and legal cases ensued.  
The Taiwanese Fair Trade Commission (TFTC) found abuse in those cases of 
a joint monopolistic position and cartels among Philips et al. While the Taipei 
Administrative High Court upheld the first finding and overruled the second, it 
took into consideration the fact that the TFTC imposed NT$ 8 million, NT$ 4 
million, and NT$ 2 million fines on Philips, Sony and Taiyo Yuden, respectively, 
in one administrative decision (not three administrative decisions) and found itself 
unable to render an ‘affirmed-in-part, vacated-in-part’ decision and instead 
compelled to rescind the TFTC’s decision completely. Both the TFTC and the 
complainant appealed the case to the Supreme Administrative Court which rejected 
the appeal on 4 April 2007.
3
 
The TFTC filed a retrial petition to the Supreme 
Administrative Court. The retrial petition was rejected by the Supreme 
Administrative Court on 18 June 2009.
4
  
The Taiwanese Intellectual Property Office (TIPO), however, did see fit to 
grant a compulsory patent license against Philips, before later annulling same – 
both decisions were made upon application. Despite the fact that on 31 May 2007 
TIPO annulled the compulsory license with immediate effect, the Taipei Admin-
istrative High Court rescinded TIPO’s decision to grant such a compulsory license.  
The ramifications of these cases have been great. The Court of Appeals for the 
Federal Circuit (CAFC) of the US, as well as the European Commission of the 
European Union (EU) were called upon. Philips, Sony and Taiyo Yuden were 
forced to change their licensing patterns and license their patents  
                                               
2 The retail price of a CD-R disc was around US$ 50 to US$ 60 when it was first put on market in  
  the early 1990s. When production started to gain momentum, the retail prices decreased to a   
  level of around US$ 10 to US$ 15. By 1997, the trade price for a CD-R disc dropped  
  significantly to around USD 2.55. By 2000, the worldwide prices for a CD-R disc fell further to  
  US$ 0.44 and continued to fall to US$ 0.2 in 2006. See European Commission, TBR  
  Investigation Report, Report to the Trade Barriers Regulation Committee, 30 Jan. 2008  
  (hereinafter TBR Report), which is available at:  
  <http://ec.europa.eu/trade/issues/respectrules/tbr/cases>, para. 34 (last visited on 15 Sep. 2009). 
3 The Supreme Administrative Court, 4 Apr. 2007, Panzi 553 (2007). 
4 The Supreme Administrative Court, 18 Jun. 2009, Panzi 661 (2009). 
separately, the CD-R industry in Taiwan suffered on account of an ailing market, 
and the applicant for compulsory license, that is Gigastorage, moved out of Taiwan 
and relocated its production lines to countries in which Philips et al. do not have 
patents. The TFTC substantially revised some of its Guidelines on Technology 
Licensing Agreements, and TIPO proposed new provisions for compulsory patent 
licensing to be included in the Patent Act. In the following, this paper will address 
the issues at the core of these cases, namely the abuse of a joint monopolistic 
position, cartel, compulsory patent licensing, and then look into the aftermath of 
these cases, concluding with some prospects for the future.  
2.  ABUSE OF A JOINT MONOPOLISTIC POSITION  
In 2000, Princo et al., Taiwanese CD-R manufacturers, accused Philips et al. of 
abusing their monopoly power in the CD-R market through patent pooling and the 
JLA to demand excessive royalties, of engaging in cartels by bundling patents and 
by licensing in packages, of tying in patents that have already expired and of 
obscuring information about the patents to be licensed. On 20 January 2001 the 
TFTC found that Philips et al. had a joint monopoly power in the CD-R 
patent-licensing technology market: they own all the important patents for the 
manufacture of CD-Rs, any production and sales of CD-Rs in the world must 
acquire license from them; they were therefore found to have an overwhelmingly 
superior position to exclude competition and enjoy a worldwide monopolistic 
status (Philips I).  
2.1.  IMPROPERLY MAINTAINING PRICES  
Philips I looked into the drastic price drop (US$ 7 for one CD-R in 1996, and less 
than US$ 0.5 in 2000) and the sixty-fold growth in volume worldwide (from 182 
million in 1997 to 3.6 billion CD-Rs in 2000). It was concluded that, by Philips et 
al.’s refusal to negotiate with its licensees regarding the matching of its royalty 
scheme to the market situation, the conglomerate could expect to see royalties in 
2000 twenty to twenty-six times more than the expected amount. Hence Philips et 
al. were found guilty of abusing their joint monopoly market power through 
charging royalties far in excess of those expected by the licensors and were 
therefore in violation of section 10(2) and (4) of the Fair Trade Act.
5
 
Philips et al. 
appealed the Philips I decision to the Executive Yuan (the Cabinet), which was not 
convinced by the TFTC’s determination of the relevant product market and vacated 
the Philips I decision, remanding it back to the TFTC. The TFTC reached a 
decision on 25 April 2002 (Philips II) with the same  
                                               
5 Section 10 of the Fair Trade Act provides: No monopolistic enterprises shall: (1) directly or 
indirectly prevent any other enterprises from competing by unfair means; (2) improperly set, maintain 
or change the price for goods or the remuneration for services; (3) make a trading counterpart give 
preferential treatment without justification; or (4) otherwise abuse its market power. 
conclusions. Philips II was appealed to and upheld by the Executive Yuan. Philips et al. 
appealed the case to the Taipei Administrative High Court. On 11 August 2005 the 
Taipei Administrative High Court concurred with the TFTC on its finding of an abuse 
of joint monopolistic market power.6 The TFTC came to the same determination on 29 
October 2009 in Philips III.7
 
 
 
2.2. OTHER EXPLOITATIVE ABUSES  
Philips et al. were also found by the TFTC in Philips I, II and III to be elusive 
about important trading information such as the contents, scope, terms and number 
of patents they individually owned. Moreover, the TFTC found that the defendants’ 
demand that licensees withdraw their invalidity applications against defendants’ 
patents as a precondition for concluding the licensing contracts was an improper 
exercise of patent rights. All of this amounted to a so-called exploitative abuse of 
monopoly power and therefore violated section 10(4) of the Fair Trade Act. On 11 
August 2005 the Taipei Administrative High Court also concurred with the TFTC 
on its finding.  
3.  DID THE DEFENDANTS FORM A CARTEL?  
3.1.  CONFIRMED BY THE TFTC  
Philips I and II found that Philips et al. were in violation of section 14 of the Fair 
Trade Act by engaging in two cartel activities.
8
 
First, Sony and Taiyo Yuden 
promised Philips that ‘all the licensing requests on their patents at issue would be 
forwarded to Philips, and no other licensing agreements would be made, except for 
other cross-licensing agreements of a broad coverage’. Second, Philips, in its  
 
                                               
6 Taipei Administrative High Court, 11 Aug. 2005, Sutze No. 908 (2003). 
7 TFTC, Gongchuzi 098156 (2009). 
8 Article 14 of the Fair Trade Act provides: No enterprise shall have any concerted action; unless the 
concerted action that meets one of the following requirements is beneficial to the economy as a 
whole and in the public interest, and the application with the central competent authority for such 
concerted action has been approved. 
response to the complainants, stated that ‘Philips, Sony and Taiyo Yuden have all 
agreed that there is only one way of calculating royalty.’ Such cartel activities were 
sufficient to affect the market function of producing and trading products or 
providing services, because Philips et al. owned all the patents necessary for the 
production of CD-R disks and thus together possessed a worldwide monopoly 
status; the collective licensing left no room for individual licensing. The TFTC 
ordered that Philips et al. license their patents separately.  
3.2.  DENIED BY THE TAIPEI ADMINISTRATIVE HIGH COURT AND THE 
SUPREME ADMINISTRATIVE COURT  
The qualification of a horizontal competition relationship is the prerequisite for the 
application of cartel prohibition of the Fair Trade Act. According to Philips I, 
defendants were horizontal competitors in the CD-R patent-licensing market 
despite the assertion made by Philips et al. that the patents they owned were 
collectively necessary and not interchangeable for the production of a certain 
product, and that the patents complemented each other. What was decisive was that 
Philips et al. admitted that they still offered individual licenses competitively, and 
in addition, each defendant had its own R&D and did compete against the others at 
the beginning stage of R&D for CD-R. Philips II emphasized that each defendant 
was potentially capable of developing other substitutable technology which could 
compete with other defendants; and that the patents owned by defendants were in 
fact interchangeable to some extent.  
However, the Taipei Administrative High Court was of a totally different opin-
ion, because it was guided by the following facts: (1) The TFTC had determined 
the ‘CD-R technology market’ as the relevant market; (2) What the TFTC defined 
as CD-R was a product produced in accordance with the standards specified in the 
Orange Book set up by Philips and Sony; (3) Local CD-R manufacturers must use 
all the patents owned by Philips et al. in order to make CD-Rs; (4) Using patents of 
any one of the three companies would not be sufficient to manufacture CD-Rs; (5) 
Therefore, patents owned by Philips et al. were complementary in nature and every 
pooled patent was indispensable, which made the patented technology no longer 
substitutable, and no competition relationship was possible between Philips et al.  
The Taipei Administrative High Court’s finding of ‘no substitutability for the 
patented technology and no competition relationship between Philips et al.’ was 
not questioned, but rather recognized by the Supreme Administrative Court as 
‘ascertaining the facts according to the law’.  
4.  THE COMPULSORY PATENT LICENSING  
In recent years, compulsory patent licensing has been in the focal point of the 
international IP arena. While compulsory patent licenses for life-saving medicines 
against, for example, HIV and other epidemics have found worldwide sympathy 
and led to many international initiatives, compulsory patent licenses aimed at 
preserving competition by, for example, curbing the network effects and mitigating 
the pinch caused by the need to comply with de jure or de facto industry standards, 
have been confronted with a cold shoulder from more-developed countries and 
even harsh criticism and threats to take WTO counter-measures. Compulsory 
patent licenses in Taiwan coincide with the global trend just described.  
4.1.  TIPO’S DECISION TO GRANT A COMPULSORY PATENT LICENSE 
AGAINST PHILIPS  
In July 2002, GigaStorage, a Taiwanese CD-R manufacturer and licensee of CD-R 
patents held by Philips, pursuant to relevant provisions of the Patent Act,
9
 
filed 
with TIPO an application for compulsory licensing of five Taiwanese patents 
owned by Philips, after having tried to no avail to negotiate with Philips to reduce 
the royalty to reflect the falling prices of CD-Rs. It was the first application since 
the enactment of the Patent Act in 1949. TIPO came to a decision two years later 
(in 2004) and permitted the applicant to use the five patents, primarily to satisfy the 
needs of domestic market until the dates when they would expire (ranging from 26 
January 2007 to 19 December 2009).
10
 
TIPO, wisely, did not touch upon the 
sensitive issue of appropriate compensation, since the object of the application for 
compulsory license was limited to the granting of such and did not involve the 
calculation of compensation. However, no agreement on the calculation of com-
pensation has ever been reached between the two parties. The administrative griev-
ance process brought by Philips was rejected by the Ministry of Economic Affairs 
(MOEA) in June 2006. Philips filed an appeal with the Taipei Administrative High 
Court in August 2006.  
4.2.  TIPO’S DECISION TO ANNUL THE COMPULSORY PATENT 
LICENSE  
GigaStorage and Philips filed applications with TIPO to annul the compulsory 
patent license on 23 April 2006 and 5 May 2006, respectively. Among other 
reasons, GigaStorage’s main consideration was that it would cease to manufacture 
CD-Rs in Taiwan on 31 May 2007 and that the compulsory license would no 
longer be needed. Philips’s application was based on the grounds that the licensee 
had exceeded the limitation of ‘primarily for domestic market’ by exporting more 
than  
                                               
9 Section 76(1) and (2) of the Taiwanese Patent Act provide: (1) In order to cope with the national 
emergencies, or to make non-profit-seeking use of a patent for enhancement of public welfare, or 
in the case of an applicant’s failure to reach a licensing agreement with the patentee concerned 
under reasonable commercial terms and conditions within a considerable period of time, the Patent 
Authority may, upon an application, grant a right of compulsory licensing to the applicant to put 
the patented invention into practice; provided that such practicing shall be restricted mainly to the 
purpose of satisfying the requirements of the domestic market. However, if the application for 
compulsory licensing of a patent right covers semiconductor technology, such application may be 
allowed only if the proposed practicing is purposed for a non-profit-seeking use contemplated to 
enhance the public welfare. (2) In the absence of the conditions set forth in the preceding 
Paragraph, the Patent Authority still may, upon an application, grant to the applicant a compulsory 
license to practice the patented invention in the event that the patentee has imposed restrictions on 
competition or has committed unfair competition, as confirmed by a judgment given by a court or a 
disposition made by the Fair Trade Commission of the Executive Yuan. 
10 For more details of the case see Kung-Chung Liu, ‘Interface between IP and Competition Law in 
Taiwan’, The Journal of World Intellectual Property 8 (November 2005): 738–741. 
50% of its produce manufactured under the compulsory license. Philips went on to 
demand that the license be retroactively annulled, in the hope of eradicating the 
precedential effect of TIPO’s decision. On 31 May 2007 TIPO decided to annul the 
compulsory license with immediate effect instead of a retroactive revocation as 
requested by Philips. Its reasoning was twofold; GigaStorage no longer needed to 
use the patents and no other public interest was at stake, and the evidence provided 
by Philips could not directly prove that GigaStorage had exported more than 50% 
of its production made under the compulsory license.
11
 
 
4.3.  THE TAIPEI ADMINISTRATIVE HIGH COURT RESCINDED TIPO’S 
DECISION TO GRANT A COMPULSORY PATENT LICENSE  
Regardless of the fact that TIPO annulled the compulsory license with immediate 
effect on 31 May 2007, and that the compulsory license was granted only to 
GigaStorage, the Taipei Administrative High Court rescinded the decisions of 
TIPO on 13 March 2008, on the grounds that when determining ‘the reasonable 
commercial terms’, TIPO failed to take into consideration factors other than the 
way royalty is calculated, such as the profit concerns of the licensor and licensee, 
the shared risks, the reputation of the technical brand, market demand, the scope 
and duration of the license, the licensed technology, competition within the indus-
try, market conditions for licensing and other terms of licensing.
12
 
On 10 April 
2008 TIPO decided not to appeal the decision, which made the case final, given the 
fact that GigaStorage and Philips had entered into a settlement agreement on 29 
October 2007.
13
 
 
5.  THE RAMIFICATIONS ABROAD  
5.1.  IN THE US: RAISING THE PATENT MISUSE ISSUE UNDER THE 
PATENT ACT  
In 2002 Philips US (Complainant) resorted to the ITC and filed with it an appli-
cation to apply section 337 of the US Customs Act in order to stop the importation 
of CD-R disks made by GigaStorage and Princo, who had not settled with it 
(Respondents) on the charge of infringing its US patents. The Respondents raised 
the defence that the patents at issue were unenforceable because the Complainant 
had engaged in patent misuse involving the creation of an unlawful patent pool and 
the use of its power to control the US CD-R and CD-RW disk markets. So, what  
                                               
11 TIPO, 31 May 2007, Zhifazi No. 09618600360. 
12 Taipei Administrative High Court, 13 Mar. 2008, Suzi No. 2783 (2006). 
13 For more details see Kung-Chung Liu, ‘Rationalising the Regime of Compulsory Patent 
Licensing by the Essential Facilities Doctrine’, International Review of Industrial 
Property and Competition Law (IIC) 39 (2008): 762. 
was under dispute was in effect the applicability of 35 USC 271(d)(5), which was 
introduced into the US Patent Act in 1988 by the Patent Misuse Reform Act. 35 
USC 271(d)(5)(d) reads as follows:  
‘No patent owner otherwise entitled to relief for infringement or contributory 
infringement of a patent shall be denied relief or deemed guilty of misuse or illegal 
extension of the patent right by reason of his having done one or more of the 
following: (5) conditioned the license of any rights to the patent or the sale of the 
patented product on the acquisition of a license to rights in another patent or 
purchase of a separate product, unless, in view of the circumstances, the patent 
owner has market power in the relevant market for the patent or patented product 
on which the license or sale is conditioned.’  
On 24 October 2003 the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) of the IFC, Sidney 
Harris, reached the final Initial Determination (ID) of patent misuse not only by the 
per se test, but also by the rule of reason test, which rendered the patents 
unenforceable. On review, the Commission affirmed the ALJ’s conclusion that the 
asserted patents were unenforceable for patent misuse per se, but on different 
grounds: Philips’s practice of mandatory package licensing constituted a tying 
agreement between license for essential patents and license for non-essential 
patents. Philips appealed the Commission’s decision to the CAFC. On 21 
September 2005 the CAFC reversed the Commission’s decision of no violation of 
section 337 of the US Customs Act and remanded the case for further 
proceedings.
14
 
The Supreme Court denied the petition brought by GigaStorage for 
a writ of certiorari on 19 June 2006. On 5 February 2007 the ITC reversed the 
ALJ’s findings of patent misuse, found a violation of section 337 and imposed a 
general exclusion order prohibiting the entry of CD-R made by GigaStorage and 
Princo.
15
 
GigaStorage and Philips entered into a settlement agreement on 29 
October 2007 to resolve their US litigation, settling all of GigaStorage’s debts 
towards Philips for CD-R production up to and including 23 September 2007.
16
 
The settlement between GigaStorage and Philips did not persuade Princo to make 
peace with Philips. Instead, it appealed the ITC’s decision on 5 February 2007 to 
the CAFC, which rendered a decision on 20 April 2009 (for more details see supra 
section 5.1.5.).  
5.1.1.  Philips Has Market Power in the Relevant Market  
According to the CAFC, although section 271(d)(5) does not define the scope of 
the defence of patent misuse, but merely provides a safe harbour against the charge 
of patent misuse for certain kinds of conduct by patentees, the statute makes clear 
that the defence of patent misuse differs from traditional antitrust law principles in 
an important respect, as applied to tying arrangements involving patent rights. In 
the case of an antitrust claim based on a tying arrangement involving patent  
                                               
14 US Philips v. Int’l Trade Commission, 424 F.3d 1179 (Fed. Cir. 2005). 
15 USITC, 337-TA-474. Notice 1170697224 (5 Feb. 2007), available at <www.usitc.gov> (last 
visited on 19 Jun. 2009). 
16 TBR Report, Executive Summary, para. 6. 
rights, ownership of a patent on the tying good is presumed to give the patentee 
monopoly power. Section 271(d)(5) makes clear, however, that such a presumption 
does not apply in the case of patent misuse. To establish the defence of patent 
misuse, the accused infringer must show that the patentee has power in the market 
for the tying product.
17
 
 
The CAFC sustained the ruling made by the ALJ and the ITC that,
18
 
although 
Philips has no market power in the worldwide product market for CD-R/RW 
(combined with its licensor-partners, it has only 8.8% and 13% of CD-Rs 
worldwide output and sales, and 2% and 10% of CD-RWs worldwide output and 
sales in 2002), Philips and its licensor-partners do have the market power of an 
absolute monopoly in the licensing market. This is because there is no 
manufacturing without license from Philips (and its licensor-partners), and Philips 
had been able to maintain the royalty rates (now representing 50%–70% of today’s 
average net selling price, and X times [the actual times was a commercial secret 
and therefore not disclosed] of those of individual rates worked out between Philips 
and its Taiwanese licensees after the FTC’s decision that demanded separate 
licensing) above competitive levels for a significant period of time.  
5.1.2.  Package License of ‘Essential’ and ‘Non-essential’ Patents  
Initially, Philips offered four different pools of patents for licensing: (1) a joint CD-R 
patent pool including patents owned by Philips and two other companies (Sony and 
Taiyo Yuden); (2) a joint CD-RW patent pool including patents owned by Philips and 
two other companies (Sony and Ricoh); (3) a CD-R patent pool including only patents 
owned by Philips; and (4) a CD-RW patent pool including only patents owned by 
Philips. After 2001, Philips offered additional package options by grouping its patents 
into two categories, ‘essential’ and ‘non-essential’, for producing compact discs 
compliant with the technical standards set forth in the Orange Book. The ‘essential’ and 
‘non-essential’ patents are licensed in package, however licensees do not have to pay 
any additional royalty fee for ‘non-essential’ patents.19 
 
5.1.3. No Patent Misuse under Per Se Analysis  
In light of the efficiencies of package patent licensing, that is the pro-competitive 
effect of reducing the degree of uncertainty associated with investment decisions, 
and the important differences between product-to-patent tying arrangements and 
arrangements involving group licensing of patents, the CAFC rejected the pre-
sumption that Philips’s conduct showed a ‘lack of any redeeming virtue’ and could 
be ‘conclusively presumed to be unreasonable and therefore illegal without elab-
orate inquiry as to the precise harm they have caused or the business excuse for  
                                               
17 US Philips v. Int’l Trade Commission, 424 F.3d 1186 (Fed. Cir. 2005). 
18 Ibid., para. 17. 
19 Ibid., para. 3. 
their use’. To apply the rule of per se illegality to Philips’s package licensing 
agreements would be legally flawed.
20
 
5.1.4.  No Patent Misuse under Rule of Reason Analysis  
The CAFC concluded that Philips’s inclusion of the four allegedly non-essential patents 
in the package licenses did not constitute patent misuse under the rule of reason either, 
because the record did not disclose that ‘any commercially viable alternative actually 
existed’ to those patents and therefore no ‘anticompetitive effects on competitors 
offering alternatives to’ those patents can be resulted therefrom.21 
 
5.1.5.  Even if Philips and Sony Agree to Suppress Sony’s Technology, Such 
an Agreement would not Constitute Patent Misuse 
On Princo’s appeal, a divided panel of the CAFC ruled on 20 April 2009 against 
the ITC and Philips. Although the panel rejected several of Princo’s arguments, it 
vacated the ITC’s remedial orders and remanded the case for further proceedings 
on one issue: (1) whether Lagadec (patent owed by Sony with a digital modulation 
method) was a potentially workable alternative to the Orange Bol technology (the 
Raaymarkers patents owned by Philips with an analog solution) and (2) whether 
Princo has established that Sony and Philips agreed that Lagadec would not be 
licensed in a manner allowing its development as competitive technology.
22
 
Philips, Princo and the ITC all field petitions for rehearing en banc. The CAFC 
granted the petitions field by Philips and the ITC, but denied the petition filed by 
Princo. However, the CAFC addresses only one issue raised by Philips, namely 
regardless of whether Philips and Sony agreed to suppress the technology 
embodied in Sony’s Lagedec patent, such an agreement would not constitute patent 
misuse and would not be a defense to Philips’s claim of infringement against 
Princo. The CAFC concludes that the conduct alleged in this case is not the type of 
conduct that could give rise to the defense of patent misuse and therefore affirms 
the ITC’s orders granting relief against Princo.23 
5.2.  IN THE EU  
On the other side of the Atlantic, Philips filed a complaint with the European 
Commission on 15 January 2007, alleging that Taiwan maintained trade barriers by 
granting compulsory licenses to certain patents held by Philips for CD-R, and that 
such measures were inconsistent with Articles 28 and 31 of the TRIPs Agreement. 
The Commission concurred with Philips by finding that the application by TIPO of 
several incorrect interpretations of the TRIPs Agreement, in combination with the 
                                               
20 Ibid., para. 41. 
21 Ibid., para. 58 
22 Princo Corporation et al v. Int’l trade Commission, 563 F. 3d 1318-19. 
23 Princo Corporation et al v. Int’l trade Commission, 2007-1386 decided: August 30, 2010, at 13. 
standard licensing practices of major licensors of intellectual property (such as 
Philips) interfered gravely with the free operation of the market; that TIPO had 
been using compulsory licenses as an industrial policy instrument, and not as a 
limited exception to the use of patent rights. The Commission reported to the Trade 
Barriers Regulation Committee (TBR) on 11 January 2008, recommending that the  
 
Commission initiate WTO action against Taiwan if concrete steps were not taken 
by Taiwan to amend its Patent Act and to ensure that the precedential effects of the 
measures were eliminated, including ensuring that the compulsory licenses were 
revoked in their entirety within two months from the transmission of this report to 
the TIPO. Its reasons were the following:  
(1)  Violation of Article 28 of the TRIPs Agreement
24
 
Section 76 of the 
Taiwanese Patent Act, which permits the granting of a compulsory license in 
situations in which there is no longer a refusal to grant a license, on reasonable 
commercial terms and conditions, and within a reasonable period of time, strips the 
substance from the exclusive rights granted by a patent and protected by Article 28 
of the TRIPs Agreement, and that inconsistency is not justified by reference to 
Article 31 of TRIPs Agreement.
25
 
 
(2)  Violation of Article 31(b) of the TRIPs Agreement
26
 
Even if the TRIPs 
Agreement were to permit a compulsory license because of failure to reach 
voluntary license on reasonable commercial terms and conditions within a 
reasonable period of time, the decisions of TIPO are based on an unwarranted 
interpretation of the notion of ‘reasonable commercial terms and conditions’. 
TIPO’s interpretation ignores the fact that the first step of any analysis of this term 
should be done in reference to the market and not to the situations of individual 
operators. The royalties charged for CD-Rs in the market (either in  
 
                                               
24 Article 28 (Rights Conferred) of the TRIPs Agreement: (1) A patent shall confer on its owner the 
following exclusive rights: (a) where the subject matter of a patent is a product, to prevent third 
parties not having the owner’s consent from the acts of: making, using, offering for sale, selling, or 
importing for these purposes that product; (b) where the subject matter of a patent is a process, to 
prevent third parties not having the owner’s consent from the act of using the process, and from the 
acts of: using, offering for sale, selling, or importing for these purposes at least the product 
obtained directly by that process. (2) Patent owners shall also have the right to assign, or transfer 
by succession, the patent and to conclude licensing contracts. 
25 TBR Report, Executive Summary, para. 10; IV. Legal Analysis, para. 107. 
26 Article 31(b), (c), (f) of the TRIPs Agreement: Where the law of a Member allows for other use of 
the subject matter of a patent without the authorization of the right holder, including use by the 
government or third parties authorized by the government, the following provisions shall be 
respected: (b) such use may only be permitted if, prior to such use, the proposed user has made 
efforts to obtain authorization from the right holder on reasonable commercial terms and conditions 
and that such efforts have not been successful within a reasonable period of time. This requirement 
may be waived by a Member in the case of a national emergency or other circumstances of extreme 
urgency or in cases of public non-commercial use. In situations of national emergency or other 
circumstances of extreme urgency, the right holder shall, nevertheless, be notified as soon as 
reasonably practicable. In the case of public non-commercial use, where the government or 
contractor, without making a patent search, knows or has demonstrable grounds to know that a 
valid patent is or will be used by or for the government, the right holder shall be informed promptly; 
(c) the scope and duration of such use shall be limited to the purpose for which it was authorized, 
and in the case of semi-conductor technology shall only be for public non-commercial use or to 
remedy a practice determined after judicial or administrative process to be anti-competitive; (d) any 
such use shall be authorized predominantly for the supply of the domestic market of the Member 
authorizing such use. 
Taiwan or elsewhere), the value of the patents to Philips and what would be a 
reasonable return from Philips’ point of view, were factors that TIPO failed to take 
into consideration. For this reason, the decisions of TIPO also violate Article 31(b) 
of the TRIPs Agreement.  
(3)  Violation of Article 31(c) of the TRIPs Agreement Article 31(c) essentially 
establishes a proportionality requirement which requires two elements. First, the 
identification of a purpose for the grant of a compulsory license and, second, a 
limit on the scope and duration of the compulsory license to that required to satisfy 
the purpose of the grant of the compulsory license. The contested decisions do not 
clearly state a purpose for the grant of the compulsory licenses. As such, it is 
impossible to conclude that the scope and duration of such use is limited to the 
purpose of that grant. In any event, there is no limitation on the scope and duration 
of the compulsory licenses beyond that which is already inherent in the compulsory 
licenses. Even if the purpose of the compulsory licenses was to bring about 
reasonable commercial terms, there is no indication which links the scope or 
duration of the compulsory licenses with the advent of such reasonable commercial 
terms. For these reasons, the contested decisions do not respect Article 31(c) of the 
TRIPs Agreement.
27
 
 
(4)  Violation of Article 31(f) of the TRIPs Agreement The aforementioned 
violations of the TRIPs Agreement have been compounded by the failure of TIPO 
to monitor effectively the manner in which the compulsory licenses have been used. 
The Commission is of the opinion that a WTO Member granting a compulsory 
license is obliged to make sure that it can ensure compliance with Article 31(f) by 
monitoring the use made of a compulsory license. TIPO has failed to meet its 
obligations in that respect. As a result, there is a violation of Article 31(f) of the 
TRIPs Agreement.
28
 
 
 
6.  THE AFTERMATH  
6.1.  AILING CD-R MARKET IN TAIWAN  
The price sank even further in 2008, to US$ 0.07.
29
 
After the JLA was ruled an 
illegal cartel by the TFTC on 20 January 2001, Philips offered the Philips-only 
license agreement, setting the royalty rate at US$ 0.06 per disc as a standard rate 
and US$ 0.045 as a reward rate for those who are in full compliance with the 
licensing agreement. The reward rate was lowered to US$ 0.035 from the third  
 
                                               
27 TBR Report, IV. Legal Analysis, paras 148, 151, 154. 
28 Ibid., para. 171. 
29 Economic Daily News, 23 Jun. 2008 (published in Mandarin): <www.udn.com> (last visited on 15 
Sep. 2009). 
quarter of 2004 to the second quarter of 2005. In the beginning of 2006, 
Philips started to offer the so-called Veeza programme with an even lower reward 
rate.
30
 
 
An increasingly ailing CD-R market in Taiwan was clearly recognizable 
alongside the development of the legal cases. Taiwan has held the largest 
worldwide market share for CD-Rs since around 1998, which peaked in 2003 
reaching 80%. However, Taiwan’s total output has decreased sharply since then, 
36% in 2004, 33% in 2005, and 28% in 2006.
31
 
Presumably, the difficulties of 
getting the royalty reduced in proportion to the free fall of CD-R prices on the one 
hand,
32and the ‘unfair competition’ from CD-Rs made in other countries where 
Philips do not have patents and cannot charge royalties for patents on the other, 
have contributed to this.
33
 
In addition, GigaStorage was dealt a severe financial 
blow by paying Philips a huge settlement fee around USD 31 million, over 
one-third of its capital.
34
 
6.2.  NEW CHARGES AGAINST PHILIPS:VIOLATING SECTION 24 OF THE 
FAIR TRADE ACT?  
Philips required the licensees to provide a detailed ‘list of manufacturing equip-
ments, suppliers, dates of installing and testing’ and ‘sales report in writing’ 
(breaking down in countries, product specifications, buyers and trademarks used) 
thirty days after the end of each quarter. The licensees filed complaints with the 
TFTC. On 26 April 2006 the TFTC found in its behaviour a violation of the 
general clause against unfair competition, namely Article 24 of the Fair Trade Act 
and imposed a fine of NT$ 6 million on Philips.
35
 
The TFTC reasoned as follows: demanding a detailed ‘list of manufacturing 
equipments, suppliers, dates of installing and testing’ to be provided by licensees  
                                               
30 TBR Report, para. 16. 
31 TBR Report, II. Factual Background, para. 27. 
32 Another Taiwan-based CD-R manufacturer, Prodisc, ranking as the fourth largest of its kind in the 
world, was also forced to discontinue the production of CD-Rs in Taiwan in August 2007, allegedly 
due to Philips ‘unwillingness to reduce the royalty to accommodate falling prices’. United Daily 
and Economic Daily News, B2, 7 May 2008 (both published in Mandarin): <www. udn.com> (last 
visited on 15 Sep. 2009). 
33 Having no other choice, GigaStorage ceased manufacturing CD-Rs in Taiwan and relocated its 
production to patent-free countries. 
34 Although the actual sum of the settlement fee is kept confidential, its rough figure can be 
calculated from the loss GigaStorage had to disclose according to Taiwanese Stock Exchange Act. 
GigaStorage reported a NT$ 3.42 loss per share for the third quarter of 2007, in which the 
settlement was reached. NT$ 3.42 (loss per share) times the registered capital of NT$ 3 billions 
equals NT$ 940 million, which can be converted to US$ 31 million at the 30 to 1 exchange rate. 
35 Section 24 of the Fair Trade Act stipulates: In addition to what is provided for in this Law, no 
enterprise shall otherwise have any deceptive or obviously unfair conduct that is able to affect 
trading order. For more discussion see Kung-Chung Liu, ‘The Unfair Competition Law in Taiwan’, 
International Review of Industrial Property and Copyright Law (IIC) 30 (1999): 377–402. 
cannot be justified by the alleged need to enforce payment of royalty, due to the 
fact that there are regular legal processes available and the ‘relativity of obligation 
(obligation can be enforced only against the obligor)’; given the fact that such lists 
constituted important commercial information concerning the operation costs and 
that Philips was competing with its licensees in the CD-R market via 
brand-licensing, such a demand was a misuse of the relatively superior market 
position that Philips possessed and might lead to unfair competition.
36
 
Philips 
appealed the case to the Executive Yuan which echoed the decision of the TFTC. 
However, on 20 October 2008, the Taipei Administrative High Court saw the 
usefulness of this information and therefore annulled the decisions by the TFTC 
and the Executive Yuan.
37
 
On 9 September 2010 the Supreme Administrative 
Court rejected the appeal filed by the TFTC.
38
  
6.3.  THE TFTC SUBSTANTIALLY REVISED ITS GUIDELINES ON 
TECHNOLOGY LICENSING ARRANGEMENTS IN 2009  
The TFTC promulgated the Guidelines on Technology Licensing Agreements 
(Guidelines) on 20 January 2001. The Guidelines were revised in 2005 and 2007 
exclusively for formatting reasons. In February 2009, part of the Guidelines were 
substantially amended and followed the European Commission in deleting the 
so-called grey clauses.
39
 
The Guidelines cover patents and know-how licenses  
                                               
36 TFTC, 26 Apr. 2006, Gonghuzi 095045 (2006). 
37 Taipei Administrative High Court, 20 Oct. 2008, Suzi No. 3612 (2007). 
38 The Supreme Administrative Court Decision Caizi 2028 (2010). 
39 Point 7 of the 2001 Guidelines illustrated following grey clauses whose legality may be 
questioned:  
(1) Technology licensing arrangement content that is likely to restrain competition or impede fair 
competition in relevant markets may violate s. 19(6) of the Act. Examples include:  
(i) Restrictions involving distinctions between regions in which the licensing is applicable within 
the territory of Taiwan during the valid term of a patent; likewise, regional restrictions on the use of 
know-how before the know-how is publicly disclosed or loses its status as a trade secret through no 
circumstance imputable to the licensor. (ii) Restrictions on the scope of sales or the trading 
counterparts of the licensee, where the restrictions are unrelated to the areas of application [of the 
licensed technology]. Restrictions on the areas or scope of applications in which the licensee may 
practice the licensed technology. (iii) Ceilings restricting the quantity of goods that may be 
manufactured or sold by the licensee, or the number of times the know-how or patented technology 
may be used. (iv) Requirements that the licensee must sell goods through the licensor or a person 
designated by the licensor. (v) Requirements that the licensee pay licensing fees based on the 
quantity of a particular type of good manufactured or sold irrespective of whether the licensee used 
the licensed technology. (2) Section 19(1) or (6) of the Act may be violated by requirements that 
the licensee purchase raw materials or component parts from the licensor or a person designated by 
the licensor, where such requirements are unrelated to reasonable and necessary efforts to assure 
effective utilization of the licensed technology, to maintain the reputation of a trademark associated 
with the licensed technology or to maintain the secrecy of the know-how involved, and where such 
requirements are likely to restrain competition or impede fair competition in relevant markets. (3) 
Section 19(2) of the Act may be violated by licensing arrangements that, without justification, give 
discriminatory treatment to licensees with regard to the terms of the arrangement or licensing fees, 
(Point 2(2) of the Guidelines). Following the US path, the Guidelines do not 
presume that the licensor possesses market power simply because he owns a patent 
or know-how (Point 3 of the Guidelines).  
6.3.1.  Analytical Steps  
Point 4 of the Guidelines delineates the analytical steps that the TFTC will follow:  
(a) The Patent Act does not exclude the application of the Fair Trade Act  
In reviewing technology licensing arrangement cases, the Commission 
will first examine the licensing arrangements with respect to Article 45 of 
the Fair Trade Act.
40
 An arrangement, which appears to be proper conduct 
in connection with the exercise of rights under the Patent Act or other 
relevant laws, but actually oversteps the scope of proper exercise of rights 
under such laws and contravenes their legislative purpose of protecting 
invention and innovation, shall be reviewed under the Fair Trade Act and 
its Rules.  
(b) Impact on relevant markets  
When reviewing technology licensing agreements, the TFTC will not 
be bound by the forms or language used. Instead, the TFTC will 
concentrate on the possible or actual restraint of competition or unfair 
competition in the following relevant markets:  
(i) ‘Goods markets’ to which the goods manufactured or provided 
through use of the licensed technology belong.  
(ii) ‘Technology markets’ defined by technology that is substitutable 
with the licensed technology.  
(iii) ‘Innovation markets’ in which research and development of relevant 
goods may take place.  
(c) Factors to be considered  
In reviewing technology licensing arrangements, in addition to the 
reasonableness of the provisions of such arrangements, the Commission 
shall consider the following factors:  
(i) The market power of the licensor with regard to the licensed 
technology.  
(ii) The market position of the parties to the arrangement at a relevant 
market and the status of that market.  
(iii) The increase of influence by the licensing arrangement on opportu-
nities for utilization of the technology or exclusion of competition.  
(iv) The degree of difficulty of access to the relevant market.  
(v) The length of the term of limitations under the licensing arrangement.  
 
                                                                                                                       
where such discriminatory treatment would be likely to restrain competition or impede fair 
competition in relevant markets. 
40 Section 45 of the Fair Trade Act reads: No provision of this Law shall apply to any proper conduct 
in connection with the exercise of rights pursuant to the provisions of the Copyright Act, Trade 
Mark Act, or Patent Act. 
 (vi) International or industry precedents applicable to the relevant market 
for the licensed technology.  
 
6.3.2.  White Clauses  
The Guidelines contain illustrative White Clauses and Black Clauses. While White 
Clauses remained unchanged, Black Clauses became more far-reaching, and the 
original illegal per se stance was relaxed. Unless improper matters were determined 
after applying Points 3 and 4, Point 5 of the Guidelines prescribes that the 
following technology licensing arrangements do not intrinsically violate the Fair 
Trade Act for restraining competition or unfair competition:  
(1) Limitations clauses that restrict the scope of use by the licensee to 
manufacture, use, or sale.  
(2) Restrictions on the period of a licensing arrangement that falls 
within the term of validity of the patent itself. Restrictions on the 
period of a licensing arrangement prior to the loss of the status as a 
trade secret and public disclosure of know-how through 
circumstances not imputable to the licensor.  
(3) Stipulations that, for ease of calculation, fees for licensed 
technology that is part of a manufacturing process or that subsists 
in component parts are to be calculated on the basis of the quantity 
of finished goods manufactured or sold that employ the licensed 
technology, or the quantity of raw materials or component parts 
used that employ the licensed technology, or the number of times 
such materials or parts are used in the manufacturing process.  
(4) Stipulations that the licensee shall continue to pay fees after 
expiration of the patent term for use already made of the licensed 
technology, where the fees for use of a licensed patent are paid in 
installments or on a postpaid [running royalty] basis. Stipulations 
that, in the event of public disclosure of the know-how and loss of 
its status as a trade secret through no circumstance imputable to the 
licensor, the licensee must continue to pay agreed fees by a certain 
period and method through the free will of the parties to the 
arrangement until the expiration or termination of the arrangement.  
(5) Stipulations that the licensee shall grant non-exclusive license to 
the licensor with respect to any improvements in or new 
applications of the licensed technology.  
(6) Stipulations that the licensee shall, to the best of its ability, 
manufacture and sell goods using the licensed technology.  
(7) Stipulations that, during the licensing period or after the expiration 
of the term of the licensing arrangement, impose on the licensee 
the obligation to maintain the secrecy of any know-how that 
retains the status of a trade secret.  
(8) Clauses that, in order to guarantee the licensor a minimum amount 
of revenue from licensing fees, require the licensee to produce a 
minimum volume of goods employing the licensed technology, to 
employ the licensed technology a minimum number of times in the 
manufacturing process, or to sell a minimum quantity of goods 
manufactured with the licensed technology.  
(9) Requirements that the licensee shall maintain a certain level of 
quality with respect to the goods, raw materials, or component 
parts of the goods that employ the licensed technology insofar as is 
necessary to ensure effective utilization of the licensed technology 
and maintain a certain level of quality in the licensed goods.  
(10) Stipulations that the licensee may not transfer or sublicense the 
licensed technology, except where otherwise agreed by the parties 
to the licensing arrangement.  
(11) Stipulations that the licensee may not continue to use the licensed 
technology after the expiration of the term of the licensing 
arrangement insofar as the licensed patent remains valid or the 
licensed know-how remains a trade secret.  
 
6.3.3.  Black Clauses  
Point 6 of the Guidelines lists arrangements that are illegal either per se or accord-
ing to a rule of reason analysis:  
(i) Arrangements between parties to a licensing arrangement who are 
in a competitive relationship, in which through contract, agreement, 
or other form of mutual understanding they jointly determine the 
price of the goods employing the licensed technology, or restrict 
quantities of goods, trading partners, trading regions, or areas of 
research and development, thus mutually restricting each other’s 
business activities in a manner sufficient to influence the functions 
of the relevant market According to Point 7, such arrangements per 
se are in violation of section 14 of the Fair Trade Act.  
(ii) Licensing arrangements that involve any of the following contents 
and are likely to restrain competition or to impede fair competition 
in relevant markets, are prohibited:  
(1) Restrictions on the licensee during and after the expiration of 
the licensing agreement with respect to research and 
development, manufacture, use, sale or adoption of competing 
technology.  
(2) Restrictions on the licensee with respect to the scope of use of 
the licensed technology, or trading counterparts, in order to 
achieve the segregation of customers or other purposes 
irrelevant to the scope of the licensing agreement.  
(3) Mandatory requirements that the licensee purchase, accept, or 
use patents or know-how not needed by the licensee.  
(4) Mandatory requirements that the licensee license back 
exclusively to the licensor any improvements to the licensed 
patent or know-how.  
(5) Restrictions on the licensee’s free use of the technology in 
question or requirement of payment of fees after the expiration 
of patents or the public disclosure of the know-how through 
circumstance not imputable to the licensee.  
(6) Restrictions on the licensee’s prices to third parties for licensed 
products it manufactured or produced.  
(7) Restrictions on the licensee’s ability to challenge the validity of 
the licensed technology.  
(8) Refusal by the licensor to provide the licensee with information 
about the content, scope, or term of the licensed patents.  
(9) Segregation of licensed areas within the national boundaries 
during the term of patents; regional limitations on the licensed 
know-how within the national boundaries prior to the loss of 
secrecy by public disclosure of the know-how through 
circumstance not imputable to the licensor.  
(10) Caps on the amount of products that the licensee may 
manufacture or sell; caps on the number that the licensee may 
practice the patents or know-how.  
(11) Restrictions that the licensee must sell through the licensor or 
parties designated by the licensor.  
(12) Requirements that the licensee must pay royalty pursuant to the 
amount of certain products manufactured or sold, regardless of 
the fact whether the licensee has actually practiced the licensed 
technology.  
 
According to Point 7, violation of the above provisions would probably contravene 
section 19(6) of the Fair Trade Act:
41
 
(iii) The licensor may not command the licensee to purchase materials and 
parts from the licensor or persons designated by the licensor, which 
exceeds the reasonable boundary of fulfilling specific function of the 
licensed technology, preserving the reputation of the licensed products, or 
of maintaining the secrecy of the know-how, and which is likely to  
                                               
41 Section 19 of the Fair Trade Act reads: No enterprise shall have any of the following acts which is 
likely to lessen competition or to impede fair competition: (1) causing another enterprise to 
discontinue supply, purchase or other business transactions with a particular enterprise for the 
purpose of injuring such particular enterprise; (2) treating another enterprise discriminatively 
without justification; (3) causing the trading counterpart(s) of its competitors to do business with 
itself by coercion, inducement with interest, or other improper means; (4) causing another 
enterprise to refrain from competing in price, or to take part in a merger or a concerted action by 
coercion, inducement with interest, or other improper means; (5) acquiring the secret of production 
and sales, information concerning trading counterparts or other technology related secret of any 
other enterprise by coercion, inducement with interest, or other improper means; or (6) limiting its 
trading counterparts’ business activity improperly by means of the requirements of business 
engagement. 
restrain competition or to impede fair competition in relevant markets. 
According to Point 7, a violation would probably contravene section 19(1) 
or (6) of the Fair Trade Act.  
(iv) The licensing agreement may not discriminate without due cause against 
the licensee in trading terms and royalty fee which is likely to restrain 
competition or to impede fair competition in relevant market. According to 
Point 7, a violation would probably violate section 19(2) of the Fair Trade 
Act. According to Point 7, when a party to a licensing arrangement, which 
violates Point 6, is a monopolistic enterprise, there would be a probable 
contravention of section 10 of the Fair Trade Act.  
6.3.4. Evaluation of the Guidelines
42
 
 
The 2009 Guidelines retain an itemized style and give no detailed reasoning or 
examples, which in reality can easily lead to formalistic application instead of the 
rule of reason approach. To the disappointment of local industries that are highly 
dependent on patent pools and standards, the Guidelines fail to crystallize from the 
Philips cases guiding principles with regard to those issues. Furthermore, it is 
unclear why the Guidelines have not incorporated the legally binding judgment 
made by the TFTC and Taipei Administrative High Court, namely the maintenance 
of a fixed royalty regardless of sharp price fall by a monopoly constitutes abuse of 
a monopolistic position. Is it because the Supreme Administrative Court did not 
express its opinion on this issue? Or has the TFTC some reservation to generalize 
such ruling into a principle? It begs for some explanations.  
6.4. THE IP COURT AWARDED PHILIPS FULL ROYALTY DESPITE OF 
VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 10 OF THE FAIR TRADE ACT  
According to Philips, Princo had signed a licensing agreement with it on 23 June 
1997, but only paid royalty for one quarter and subsequently ceased to pay from 
the 4th quarter of 1997. Philips was forced to terminate the licensing agreement on 
21 March 2000. Philips filed suit for royalty payment in around 2000. The Shinju 
District Court soon suspended the trial due to the then pending antitrust cases 
brought by Princo. It resumed the trail when the Supreme Administrative Court  
                                               
42 For an evaluation of the 2001 Guidelines see Kung-Chung Liu, supra n. 13, 757. 
rejected the appeal filed by the TFTC on 4 April 2007. The Shinju District Court 
came to a decision on 15 August 2008 which awarded Philips the full royalty of 
JPY 2,353,850,000, calculated by JPY 10 times the amount of CD-Rs produced by 
Prico. The reasoning behind the decision was very straightforward; the licensing 
agreement was valid despite the fact that it had been found by the Taipei Admin-
istrative High Court and confirmed by the Supreme Administrative Court to con-
travene section 10(2) of the Fair Trade Act. What is really surprising is that the 
newly-established (1 July 2008) Intellectual Property Court, acting as a court of 
second instance in a civil case, concurred and did not question the reasonableness 
of the royalty.
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6.5.  THE DRAFT COMPULSORY PATENTLICENSING PROVISIONS  
TIPO proposes to revise compulsory patent licensing provisions as part of its 
ambitious effort to overhaul the Patent Act. The gist of this endeavour is to limit 
TIPO’s power to grant compulsory licenses upon application and to empower 
TIPO to grant compulsory licenses in cases of restraint of competition and unfair 
competition which have been adjudicated by court or disposed by the TFTC, 
without having to wait for the decision to become final.  
The Patent Act Revision Draft prepared by TIPO has been approved by the 
Executive Yuan on 3 December 2009 and awaits the enactment by the Legislative 
Yuan . The draft provides in section 89:  
(i) In case of national emergencies other circumstances of extreme urgency, TIPO 
‘must’ grant a compulsory license and notify the patentee as soon as possible when 
it is commanded by the ‘Emergency Decree’ issued by the President, or requested 
by other competent authorities which may need to practice the patent at issue.  
(ii) Upon application, TIPO may grant a compulsory license in one of the following 
cases and only to the extent that it is necessary:  
(1) Not-for-profit practice that would enhance public interest.  
(2) The practice of an invention patent or a utility model, which possesses 
important technical improvement(s) with considerable economic significance, 
would inevitably infringe upon other prior inventions or utility models.  
(3) The holder of a plant variety right, which possesses important technical 
improvement(s) with considerable economic significance, must practice biotech 
patents of others.  
(4) The patentee has imposed restrictions on competition or has committed unfair 
competition which has been adjudicated by court or disposed by the Fair Trade 
Commission.  
 
                                               
43 The Intellectual Property Court, Civil Patent Shangzi No. 14 (2008), 23 April 2009.. 
 (iii) The grant of a compulsory license with regard to semiconductor patents 
is limited to paragraph 2(1) and (4).  
(iv) The grant of a compulsory license pursuant to paragraph 2(1)–(3) is only 
permissible after the applicant has failed to secure a licensing agreement 
under reasonable commercial terms and conditions within a considerable 
period of time.  
(v) Patentee, whose patent has been compulsorily licensed pursuant to 
paragraph 2(2)–(3), may file an application with TIPO, with reasonable 
terms and conditions, for the granting of compulsory license with regard 
to the new invention patent, utility model and plant variety.  
 
7. FUTURE PROSPECTS  
The Philips CD-R cases are bound to be landmark cases in many ways for Taiwan, 
and hopefully also for countries which try to move upward in the value chain of 
international separation of labour. The antitrust law, when properly applied, could 
help balance the interests of IP right holders and commercial IP users who make 
decisive contributions in the dissemination and proliferation of new products 
embodying the IP at issue (such as CD-R). However, different jurisdictions may 
apply antitrust laws to, for example, package licensing of patents, differently. 
Continuous study of the merits and shortcomings of package licensing of patents is 
indispensable in the endeavour to understand and mend differences.  
 
In the future, both the TFCT and the Administrative Courts will be better advised 
to exert more scrutiny on: 
1. The other form of improperly maintaining prices by monopolistic 
undertaking, namely price squeeze. In theory, vertically integrated 
enterprises in a market of product standardization (not differentiation) are 
tempted to exercise price squeeze strategy by maintaining the royalty rate 
for the upstream technology licensing market at high level and thereby 
squeeze the profits out of technology licensees in the downstream product 
market, in order that they cannot compete with the licensor, thereby 
excluding competition in the downstream product market. 
2. Patent pools. Patent pools are a two-edged knife. On the one hand, patent 
pools can reduce transaction costs by avoiding frictions between contesting 
patentees and speed up the proliferation of new products. On the other, 
patent pools can raise barriers to the entrance to downstream markets 
through restriction of use and can be used as a disguise for cartel by 
horizontally competitive enterprises. Generally speaking, patent pools 
consisted of complementary patents raise no concerns of restricting 
competition. By contrast, patent pools consisted of blocking patents are 
subject to hostile scrutiny from courts. It would be a matter of first priority 
to tell a patent pool consisted of complementary patents from that consisted 
of blocking patents. Otherwise, patent pools can easily elude antitrust 
screening by asserting their complementary nature and non-competitive 
relationship between the pool members. 
